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Senator Wayne Allard 
 
 




Good afternoon.  It is a pleasure to be here with all of 
you today at the National Space Forum, and it is an 
honor to be here with so many industry experts and 
leaders.  I thank our sponsors, the Eisenhower Center 
for Space and Defense Studies at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy and also the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, for hosting this important event 
and for giving me an opportunity to speak to you 
today.  In the Senate I have long supported the Center 
for Space and Defense Studies, and I am pleased to 
see the Center executing its goals of supporting and 
fostering a national dialogue on space.  
 
As a member of the Senate Appropriations and 
Budget Committees, a former member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, co-chairman of the 
Congressional Space Power Caucus, and member of 
the Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, I am 
extremely interested in the topic of this forum: the 
space policy challenges facing the new presidential 
administration.  
 
Unquestionably, 2008 is shaping to be a landmark 
year in American history as we will be electing a 
president in the first true open-seat election in 80 
years, as no incumbent candidate is running in the 
primaries. Certainly much has changed since then.  In 
1928 space travel and space exploration existed in 
imaginations, and was only conceptualized in the 
minds and drawing boards of the world’s greatest 
scientists who could only hope man would possess 
the ability to reach outer space within their lifetimes.  
It would have been very difficult to conceive that just 
three decades later man would reach space, and 11 
years after that monumental achievement, we would 
be walking on the moon and repairing orbital 
structures in space.   
 
As Americans, we are now able to both celebrate our 
rich and storied history with space, while looking 
forward to what achievements lay ahead.  Just last 
week the United States celebrated the 50th 
anniversary of Explorer 1, the first U.S. satellite to 
orbit Earth and today marks the 50th anniversary of 
the creation of the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency in response to Sputnik.  NASA is also 
commemorating its golden anniversary this year.  The 
first 50 years in space have yielded incredible results 
and discoveries that have shaped the world we live in 
today. Strategically, though, we have reached a 
crossroads; we have proven we can get there, and 
must now decide what we want to do, now that we’re 
there.  
 
While politically 2008 may be remembered as a year 
for the ages, 2009 will quickly usher in many difficult 
and daunting challenges for a new administration and 
our 44th president. Washington always has and 
always will play a game of competing priorities, and 
for space it will be no different.  The administration 
will be forced to choose and determine where, and in 
what capacity, it wants to prioritize space, including 
NASA, the Department of Defense’s numerous 
agencies and the regulation of commercial space.  In a 
broad sense, space will be forced to compete for 
limited dollars with the numerous programs, 
departments and agencies supported by our 
government. Money will be used to equip and support 
our troops, as well as to meet the needs of veterans. 
Domestic priories such as healthcare and social 
security are sure to require much attention, as will our 
evolving energy needs and of course the state of the 
economy is sure to factor in heavily as well.  
 
After sifting though these many and sometimes 
conflicting priorities, the next President will face a 
 
 
host of policy decisions within the numerous areas of 
space, including: retirement of the Space Shuttle and 
making operational the next general human 
spaceflight vehicles; joint civil and military Earth 
observation capabilities; replacement of national 
security space assets and next generation blocks; and 
government utilization of commercial remote sensing 
capabilities for geo-spatial intelligence needs.  
 
To further complicate this task, these decisions and 
activities will not be made in isolation, as space 
activities have increased globally, with more nations 
seeking to gain strategic and economic advantages 
through the use of space. It is no longer just the U.S. 
and Russia in space.  Globalization now reaches 
beyond the globe itself.  New partners, like India, are 
seeking to send spacecraft to the Moon.  And 
uncertainty around utilization of the assembled 
Internal Space Station means opportunities and the 
necessity for international cooperation in civil space 
will continue to expand dramatically.    
  
America’s accomplishments in space have been 
numerous and influential. I’m positive you all could 
recite dozens of examples of products and services we 
all use everyday that were created through our space 
programs that enhance our quality of life: ATM 
machines, GPS technology, enriched baby food, and 
athletic shoes are just a few of the thousands of 
products that exist. Despite all this success, the space 
industry and space agencies will have to continue to 
prove their worth and validate their usefulness to a 
new Administration in order to receive federal 
dollars.  Our space programs and the commercial 
space industry have both developed though 
innovation and competition - these challenges are 
nothing new. Whether policy makers like it or not, 
space can’t be ignored and will continue to evolve to 
become even more intertwined within our daily lives.  
 
Through the years, space has continued to provide a 
distinct and unquestioned strategic advantage in 
ensuring our national security. Today’s world is no 
exception, and our military depends on space more 
than ever. Space assets are used for targeting, 
communications, weather, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance, navigation and numerous other 
functions. There is no doubt the military space 
domain is here to stay, the only question remains is 
how a new Administration will best utilize this 
platform.   
 
From a policy perspective, a number of choices exist. 
How, and in what ways should we expand our space 
assets and to what degree are we willing to become 
even more dependent upon them for national 
security?  In turn, to what degree do we need to 
protect our assets, and how significantly are they at 
risk?  How will we apply existing, and perhaps 
outdated, space polices to this new world with real 
threats to our space domination? I agree with 
STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton that 
the space domain needs a bit of an image change. We 
can’t simply think of space as just an enabler for other 
domains, and we need to transition our thinking and 
protocol to allow our land, sea, and air components to 
adequately and effectively support our space assets as 
well. The new administration will have to choose how 
it will incorporate and integrate space more 
completely into the big picture of national security.   
 
Further, I believe we are already overdue in 
determining and defining our comprehensive policy 
related to our strategic space assets. Existing policy 
states that other nations have the right to use space for 
peaceful purposes and also have the right to defend 
their interests. However, we lack clarity as to what 
enforcement mechanisms exist for the U.S., and to 
what extent we will go to defend our space interests.  
There is no definitive line-in-the-sand, no borders in 
this ever-changing world of competing space 
interests.  Our overall national policies must be 
adjusted in order to be prepared for any threat that 
may exist.   
 
As we all remember, the Chinese ASAT test 
collectively woke up the world and reminded us that 
we are not alone in space; it is not our playground and 
not solely our domain. Further, it proved that China 
has an intense interest in developing space 
capabilities. Major policy choices and decisions need 
to be made in order to counter and prepare for any 
 
 
challenge to our space dominance. This is 
increasingly imperative as we become more 
dependent on our space assets as this increased 
reliance makes our satellites and other assets more 
appealing targets for potential enemies. These 
decisions must be made in conjunction with an 
increased integration of space assets into all defense-
wide operations in order for the U.S. to meet our full 
potential and integrate into a unified network.  
Technology is advancing so quickly that our policies 
are failing to keep up, and new space integration 
doctrine must be created that standardize tactics and 
procedures. We cannot afford to stovepipe our 
capabilities.  
 
This year already, the issue of space weaponry has 
made headlines. It has been reported that China and 
Russia are planning to introduce next week a draft 
treaty for the “Prevention of Placement of Weapons 
in Outer Space” at the International Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva. In response, it is my 
understanding that U.S officials have announced their 
opposition to this treaty. This topic is certainly not 
going away, and has long-reaching political 
consequences. Likely, this will become an 
increasingly more influential political issue in coming 
years, and the next administration will need to 
develop policy specifically related to weapon 
proliferation in space as part of their comprehensive 
foreign policy strategy. As such, I predict that an 
unprecedented, concrete international agreement will 
be forged regarding the issue of weapons in space 
because the eventual prevalence of the issue and the 
attention it acquires world-wide. Further, I believe 
this will be sought with controversy and conflicting 
self-interests due to the parties involved, and it is my 
hope the U.S. does not compromise any of our self 
interests in such negotiations.   
 
The next administration will also be confronted with 
the need to further incorporate and integrate cyber 
defense systems into our military. The Air Force has 
already stood up a provisional Cyber Command, and 
I’ve strongly advocated for its basing to be located in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Air Force Cyber 
Command will ensure the freedom from attack in the 
cyberspace domain. This decade has already seen 
several attacks on our cyber infrastructure by China. 
In May 2001 Chinese hackers successful took down 
the White House Web site for almost three hours. The 
effects of a cyber attack can be crippling.  Last year, 
Estonia witnessed first-hand the effects of a 
successful large-scale attack when a coordinated 
Russian attack disabled many commercial and 
governmental websites in the nation for several days. 
 
The cyber threat is real, and can amount to much 
more than a mere inconvenience. Its scope stretches 
far beyond the “white-collar warriors” who attack 
from behind their monitors.  A successful attack is the 
equivalent of modern-day industrial sabotage. On the 
battlefield, our military uses cyber tools to disable and 
destroy remotely triggered IEDs in Iraq, conduct 
electronic warfare operations, halt terrorist use of 
GPS and satellite communications, and prevent 
jamming of frequencies. Disruption of these abilities 
can be deadly; these are not threats we can afford to 
take lightly. The next administration will have to 
determine to what degree we will incorporate 
cyberspace and how will that relate to our overall 
space goals. Further integration of many systems 
including the broader domains of space and 
cyberspace will be a daunting task, and could make 
the monumental Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 look 
like a simple piece of legislation.   
 
In addition to the formal integration of these new 
platforms, the next administration will be confronted 
with the proverbial fork-in-the-road regarding missile 
defense. The Bush administration has been a strong 
advocate for the program and has significantly 
restructured our missile defense assets.  The Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) has received strong bi-
partisan support in Congress.  The FY 2008 budget 
cycle, however, was not so kind.  Last year, one of 
MDA’s top priorities, the placement of proposed 
missile defense installations in Europe, was funded 
$85 million below the budget request, and the project 
garnered headlines world-wide and triggered strong 




Other important MDA programs also received 
decreased funding last year, including the Space 
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) sensor 
development project, which is critical to increasing 
our ability to actively monitor threats around the 
globe.  STSS provides worldwide tracking, 
discrimination and fire control. This program was 
funded at about one-third less than the President’s 
request.  STSS has grown in cost, but remains 
essential to our ability to effectively monitor future 
threats. Additionally, other programs such as the 
Multiple Kill vehicle and the Airborne Laser are also 
crucial to developing a stronger and more 
sophisticated missile defense system.   
 
Aside from cuts to these big-name projects, I was also 
disappointed in proposed Congressional funding cuts 
for education and development centers. The Missile 
Defense Space Experimentation Center located at 
Shriever Air Force Base is critical to develop our 
future space-based capabilities, and the advancements 
made there contribute directly to the success of such 
programs like STSS.  I was able to work with my 
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, 
Senators Inouye and Stevens, to keep the full 
requests, but the support was not automatic and does 
not bode well for the future of the program under a 
less enthusiastically supportive Administration. 
 
In FY ’08 Congress prioritized systems that are ready 
or nearing completion for deployment as opposed to 
more futuristic systems, and it will be intriguing to 
see what pattern develops entering the new 
administration.   It is of great concern to me if the 
priorities reflected in FY 2008 continue to veer even 
farther away from long-term development. It is 
import for us to keep U.S. industries active in the 
program and include our allies like Japan, with whom 
we are cooperating to build an ICBM interceptor that 
could be deployed from an Aegis cruiser. In the long-
term, the MDA’s goal is to build a global system, 
which is equipped to meet an unpredictable global 
threat. As such, space is paramount to accomplishing 
this goal.  
 
As you know, our system today consists of space-
based detection sensors, ground-based and seaborne 
early warning and tracking sensors, ground-based 
interceptors in Alaska and California for long-range 
defense, transportable ground-based Patriot 
capability, and sea-based interceptors to engage short 
and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our system 
features multiple defensive layers with system 
elements working together synergistically to enhance 
the capability as a whole. As advanced as our system 
is, it is far from invincible as we are still very much 
tethered to the ground and sea. 
 
 The new administration and Congress needs to 
determine what degree of investment it wants to place 
in future development. What we lack right now is a 
specific program that would develop a space layer of 
interceptors. I would like to see this administration, as 
well as the next begin to develop such a layer. 
Unquestionably, this would translate into an 
incredible strategic advantage.  
 
A layer of space-based interceptors would enable a 
global on-call missile defense capability that could 
produce a timely response to rapidly evolving 
situations, and would enable the U.S. to be prepared 
for all types of threats that could develop out of 
unpredictable locations.  
 
Of course such capabilities are accompanied with a 
high price-tag, and must compete with other priorities 
within the defense budget as well as the national 
budget in a hotly contested political environment. 
Even so, it is important to remember that such 
developments would not exist in a vacuum, but would 
be part of a complex and integrated system. The next 
administration will have to choose which direction to 
take, and which way it wants to go: continue the trend 
demonstrated in the 110th Congress of prioritizing 
near term projects at the expense of future projects or 
invest in comprehensive long-term goals such as 
space-based interceptors that would be able to reach 
targets more rapidly and are capable of destroying 




Most certainly the cost of a ballistic missile nuclear 
strike against a U.S. city would be enormous; the 
economic toll alone is estimated to be $4 trillion. 
There would be no conceivable way to calculate or 
compensate for the loss of life and moral. The next 
president must determine these priories, assess our 
enemies’ capably and make the best decision.  After 
60 years of developing missile defense technology, 
we have reached the point were we must choose a 
direction. 
 
It is my prediction that within the next 
Administration, missile defense will become a much 
less polarizing political issue than it has been in the 
past. As counties like China and now Iran, which this 
week test-launched the country's first low-orbit 
research satellite, begin looking toward space, the 
threat to American space dominance will become 
more apparent. Despite recent events in China, North 
Korea and Iran, skeptics of missile defense continue 
to characterize the threat from other nations as 
hypothetical and merely an academic exercise 
because the U.S. has remained so much farther 
advanced than our adversaries. We will be forced to 
acknowledge and confront these challenges because 
they will be unavoidable. I predict the debate to shift 
from “should we” to “how should we best” invest in 
missile defense.   
  
Utilizing space for national security comes in many 
forms, including data imagery. The next 
administration will have to determine the appropriate 
role for commercial geo-spatial data providers and the 
government. Particularly, the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National 
Geospatial Agency (NGA) has expressed concerns 
recently about the relationship and reliance upon 
commercial-data providers and expressed a need for 
more “in house” imagery services. With more 
commercial companies emerging with business cases 
for entering parts of space that were previously only 
in the government domain, the question will 
inevitably be raised as to what capabilities are vital, 
and what capabilities can be effectively provided by 
the private sector.  This addresses an inherent and 
time-old debate over the usefulness of contractors, 
and whether a particular service should be considered 
inherently governmental.  
 
President Bush’s Commercial Remote Sensing Policy 
from April 2003 states that the fundamental goals 
include “relying to the maximum practical extent on 
U.S. commercial remote sensing capabilities for 
filling imagery and geospatial needs.” However a 
recent and influential report released last fall 
recommended against the current NGA model of 
using multiyear contracts with commercial data 
providers to procure imagery and favored a more 
traditional business model of government owned and 
operated satellites. The administration will be 
confronted with the decisions of how to regulate and 
manage the relationship between these apparent 
conflicting concerns. Industry is naturally concerned 
about this potential policy switch, and contends that  
if their business with the U.S. Government is greatly 
reduced, the market could give rise to foreign 
companies filling that void, companies that the U.S. 
has no control over, which could produce yet another 
security concern.   
 
The incoming administration must pursue policies 
that will enable healthy commercial space activities in 
all sectors of the industry, while leveraging existing 
commercial space capabilities. The United States is 
facing unprecedented international competition in this 
arena. New competitors have emerged in the space 
exploration field. China, India, Japan, Russia and 
Europe are all taking a more active and innovative 
role in space travel and commercial development. The 
X-Prize Foundation recently announced the Google 
Lunar X Prize, which invites private teams from 
around the world to build a robotic rover capable of 
landing on the Moon. Virgin Galactic, based in 
California, has plans for SpaceShipTwo, a six-
passenger space liner with suborbital passenger 
services in 2008. Over seas, EADS-Astrium is 
developing a four-person spacecraft to make 
suborbital trips with the possibility of the first 
commercial flight in 2012.  
 
The next administration will also have to confront the 
reality of an emerging commercial space industry, 
 
 
which is growing at the same time the government’s 
space systems are in transition. By 2010 the Space 
Shuttle program will be retired, and it likely will be 
three to five years where NASA can not send man 
into space; the question remains what will fill that 
void? For this reason, it is imperative that the United 
States government continue to promote private and 
commercial space exploration, developing a vibrant 
and ground-breaking commercial sector. The question 
will also be raised about the appropriate usage of 
government funds, and if the government is financing 
projects that duplicate commercial capabilities. 
Recent developments in commercial and civil space 
exploration, namely Spaceship One, incorporate 
innovative technologies, knowledge and existing 
infrastructures to explore and support the future 
human space exploration. Further collaboration and 
communication will be needed to meet the 
requirements of future space exploration while 
pursuing a cost-effective and sustainable approach. 
Taking this new and unique opportunity to further 
develop partnerships with the private and commercial 
space industry will mean the United States maintains 
it competitive and technological advantage. 
 
The administration will also have to formulate its 
long-term strategic vision; will it move away from 
President Bush’s “vision for space exploration” that 
focuses on permanent lunar bases similar to the 
International Space Station and a return to the Moon 
by 2020 in preparation for eventual human 
exploration of Mars and other destinations?  Will new 
alternatives be proposed and will a strategic shift take 
place? The Vision for Space has broad implications 
for NASA as almost all the funds are expected to 
come from other existing NASA programs. Congress 
is still seeking to balance NASA’s exploration 
activities and other existing programs like science and 
aeronautics research. Congress last authorized NASA 
in 2005 for FY 2007 and 2008, so reauthorization of 
NASA in FY 2009 and beyond could provide a new 
administration the opportunity to shape future polices 
considerably. Given the current political situation, it 
is entirely possible that Congress will not be able to 
provide comprehensive and long-term authorization 
this year. That would provide the new administration 
with an opportunity to implant a firm footprint on 
NASA’s future.  
 
NASA will need to reshape its workforce in order to 
better align the mix of skills with the needs for future 
missions, and to ensure that NASA will have the 
necessary skills to achieve the new vision. 
Consequently, NASA sees a need to identify those 
skills that will no longer be needed, take steps to 
retrain and reshape the workforce, and be able to 




 In conclusion, after 50 years in space we truly have 
reached a crossroads and the next president will face 
complicated and vital decisions regarding our future 
in space. Chiefly, we need to encourage more math 
and science students. It is an alarming fact that 
universities awarded more than twice the number of 
bachelors’ degrees in physics 50 years ago than they 
do today. We need to replace retiring space 
professionals in reinvigorate the workforce. This, to 
some degree is accomplished by forums like we have 
today. At its core, space exploration is inspirational. 
We strive to inspire the next generation of ambitious 
engineers, astronauts and explorers. I truly hope that 
more young people will be able to experience and 
benefit from space exploration. The Center for Space 
and Defense Studies and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies perform a vital role in our 
efforts to bring attention back to space, and excite 
individuals about what possibilities that exist in the 
future. Thank you again for this opportunity.   
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I would like to thank the Eisenhower Center for 
Space and Defense Studies and the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies for the invitation 
to speak today.  I would also like to thank Dr. 
Hamre , Ambassador Harrison, and Peter Teets for 
their leadership.  Peter Teets is a good friend and 
great space leader and I am honored to be among 
such individuals who I hold in high regard.  
  
My objective here today is to provide my 
thoughts and observations on national security 
space issues being discussed in Congress and 
prospects for the upcoming budget year.  The 
specific topics I plan to discuss are:  
 
• Understanding our dependence on space;  
• Space protection and space situational 
awareness;   
• Space acquisition and a few key space 
programs. 
 
The public in general and many members 
have no idea how dependant we are on space and 
how essential it has become to so many aspects of 
our daily lives. 
 
As this forum knows all too well, we have 
seen great growth in the commercial and civil uses 
of space.   
 
• The global space industry grew to nearly $220 
billion last year; an 18-percent annual increase.      
• Last year, the satellite television industry grew 
by 20-percent, GPS equipment by 43-percent, 
and satellite radio by 96-percent.   
• GPS is essential to commercial aviation, 
commercial shipping, enhanced 9-1-1 
emergency services, in-vehicle navigation, 
fleet/vehicle tracking and financial transactions.   
• Agriculture Uses:  GPS and remote sensing is 
used to track farm equipment, assess crop 
health, and forecast crop production. 
 
Space is also integral to modern day 
warfighting.  I like to explain to my colleagues that 
the F-22, U-A-S, cruiser, or F-C-S system they 
support isn’t very effective without space. 
 
• General Dogden tells the story that when he 
asked a soldier if he needs space, the soldier 
replied no, All I just need is my weapon and this 
black box to tell me where I am and to talk to 
my commander.   
• Tactical SATCOM enables divisions to have 
communications over extreme distances. 
• In Iraq today, U.S. soldiers manning Joint 
Security Stations carry satellite maps of local 
neighborhoods.  MRAPs carry GPS and 
SATCOM-enabled blue force tracking systems. 
• In June 2006, Al Qaida leader al-Zarqawi was 
targeted with one F-15 sortie and two 500 pound 
bombs. This successful strike mission was 
heavily reliant on space, and included: High-
resolution satellite imagery and other 
intelligence to geo-locate the target within 
meters; Satellite communications to the cockpit 
for real-time updates; and GPS-guided precision 




I believe a greater emphasis must be placed 
on space protection and space situational awareness.  
I was successful in securing legislation on this 
topic.  This year’s conference report directs the 
Secretary of Defense and DNI to develop a space 
protection strategy.   
 
The threat to space is clear and growing.  In 
particular, I find China’s military modernization in 
counterspace quite worrisome.  I have not seen a 
coherent, comprehensive strategy from the 
Department on how it would address these threats.  
The legislation asks that the following questions be 
considered: 
 
• First, what implications do these threats 
have on our nation’s future space 
architecture and investment strategy?  
• Second, what material and non-material 
solutions are needed? 
• And third, can improvements be made in 
how the defense and intelligence 
communities acquire and manage S-S-A 
and protection capabilities? 
 
Simply put, it’s impossible to know HOW to 
protect our space assets if we don’t know WHAT to 
protect, from a global, commercial, and military 
standpoint.  In this case, I’m speaking about both 
black and white space.  I’ve tried as Chairman and 
now Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee to attract national attention to the 
issue of space control.  We need more education 
and awareness on these issues.    
 
I am concerned about D-O-D budgeting for 
S-S-A and protection capabilities.  Less than 4-
percent of the over-all space budget is spent in these 
areas  --  and that doesn’t include NRO, or, Black 
space.  Is this enough?  I don’t believe it is.  Our 
ability to take advantage of space is limited by our 
modest investments in the protection of our space 
assets.  In fiscal year 2008, several key initiatives, 
such as the Self-Awareness S-S-A system, 
RAIDRS, and the Space Fence, ended up on the Air 
Force unfunded priority list.  In a welcome move, it 
appears the FY 2009 budget request increases S-S-
A and protection resources by about 12-percent. 
 
 We have a fragile space architecture at this 
moment in time.  We have a real opportunity to 
look hard at our national architectures, change our 
investment strategies, and leverage commercial and 
perhaps foreign partner capabilities.  I am 
concerned that we say we have redundancies and 
alternatives, but where are the details?  
 
 China’s ASAT test raises some important 
policy and operational issues we have yet to work 
through.  Do we need more emphasis on war games 
and exercises?  Surely, we need to work through 
policy issues and concepts of operations ahead of 
time through war games and exercises in realistic 
environments.   
 
 I’d like to pose some questions to this body 
and ask that you give them thought as you continue 
your panel discussions: 
 
• As we think about deterrence against 21st 
century threats, how do we apply deterrence to 
space?  Can we deter others from holding our 
space systems at risk?  
• Do we have clear “trip lines” or thresholds for 
action?  Our current policy is silent on this.  
Would a policy that signals our intent and lays 
out consequences be more effective? 
• How would U.S. policymakers respond if 
attacked?  What about our response to laser 
dazzling or jamming during peacetime?  Neither 
case is acceptable, and what should the 
consequences be?  
• What impacts would an attack have on 
combatant commanders’ war plans and what 
implications does it have for their future 
capability needs?   
• What is our military’s response posture?  Would 
we seamlessly transition to redundant or 
alternative capabilities?  What decision-making 
and C-2 mechanisms would we need in place 
ahead of time?  
 
 
• What diplomatic options should we consider 
and what role should our friends and allies play?  
Do treaties work to hold actors accountable, or, 
are there other international instruments we can 
leverage?  
 
 I look forward to the protection strategy the 
Department must deliver to Congress later in the 
year.  I expect our subcommittee to hold hearings 
and additional briefings on this subject.  Some of 
these important policy questions and options can be 
debated in the open; other discussions will be 
classified. 
 
 I am concerned about the affordability of the 
national security space portfolio.  I support space 
modernization programs.  I think one of the most 
exciting things our nation does is in space and I’m 
proud to be associated with it.  However, how do 
we manage modernization with limited resources?     
 
 I have observed continued cost growth and 
schedule delays with ongoing acquisition programs 
and expect big bills for TSAT, GPS-III, Space 
Radar, and other NRO systems.  Can the D-O-D 
and I-C execute all their space acquisition plans?  
 
 I am an advocate for increasing the space 
topline, and was pleased to see the Air Force space 
budget increase by roughly $500 million.  Getting 
this through Congress will be tough, however, as 
budget pressures with Iraq and Afghanistan, force 
reset, and military healthcare continue to rise.  
Additionally, Congressional PAYGO restrictions 
and a lack of appetite for increased taxes will also 
limit the flexibility of Congress to authorize 
increased budgets.  I am afraid Congress will be 
looking for bill payers, and I will continue to make 
the case that space spending is already at the bare 
minimum and cannot be reduced in the future 
without consequences.  
 
 With concerns about vulnerabilities and 
single-point failures, we must change the legacy 
model of building a few large, expensive, complex 
satellites.  Demand for robust systems engineering 
will continue as we continue to insist on more 
tradespace reviews—what architecture, 
requirements, and design tradeoffs can be made to 
lower complexity and/or cost?   
 
 I am concerned about budget estimates, the 
predictability of costs, limiting government 
requirements growth, and contractor “add-ons.”  I 
like “Back-to-Basics” acquisition approach; it is 
similar to my “First-Things-First” philosophy.  I 
believe the community has turned the corner, but 
still has to prove it works.   
 
 Let me touch briefly on key space programs 
and some other topics of importance to me. 
 
 I have supported Space Radar for many 
years now.  Last year, Congress received letters of 
support for this program from warfighters and 
intelligence chiefs.  (Dr. Sega)  However, 
committees and members disagreed on the value 
and technical solution for Space Radar. 
 
 I expect the debate to continue.  Congress is 
expecting a detailed, revised acquisition strategy 
and an independent review of alternatives 
 
 TSAT.  Both the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees fully supported TSAT.  I was, 
therefore, disappointed with the $150 million cut by 
the appropriators.  I am equally disappointed by the 
Department’s decision to cut $4 billion from the 
program because so many other defense programs 
are relying on TSAT, such as F-C-S.  I dislike that 
TSAT is penalized even though it has followed a 
sound approach to maturing technology and 
applying “Back-to-Basics.”   
 
 GPS.  I was equally disappointed with the 
$100 million GPS-3 cut.  We need to move to GPS-
3 as quickly as possible.  I support the incremental 
block approach being taken by the program office 
and am happy to see the Department moving 




 Operationally Responsive Space.  I was at 
Kirtland when the Space Development and Test 
Wing stood up.  I see promise in O-R-S.  It offers 
potential surge, reconstitution, and niche 
capabilities.  I am aware there has been debate 
within the community on the focus of O-R-S.  Our 
intent, codified in 2007 legislation, is a focus on 
getting simple, low cost solutions rapidly on-orbit to 
meet the needs of our combatant commanders.  A 
secondary benefit is that it provides more frequent 
opportunities to prove-out innovative concepts and 
technologies at a lower cost.   
 
 On the subject of black-white space 
integration, last October I sent a letter to Secretary 
Gates asking him to re-establish the dual-hatted 
undersecretary position. I thought Pete Teets did a 
good job in this role.  I don’t understand why one 
person cannot provide oversight and leadership 
across national security space.  The Secretary of 
Defense has the entire defense portfolio under him. 
 
 I know opinions in Congress vary.  I believe 
one person setting policy and making decisions in 
the context of an integrated architecture is 
beneficial and reduces unnecessary overlaps, 
especially in planning and acquisition.  
 
 I also want to touch briefly on missile 
defense and space.  Since the Bush Administration 
withdrew from the A-B-M treaty, we have seen 
great progress in fielding a ballistic missile defense 
system in a short period of time.  As we look 
forward, I believe space will play a greater role 
beyond missile warning capabilities like SBIRS.   
 
 I would like to revisit space-based 
interceptors.  While I support and prefer passive and 
reversible methods for protection, I cannot discount 
the potential utility of defensive space-based 
interceptors.  Why space-based interceptors?  The 
orbital debris is entirely undesirable.  However, 
against an incoming ballistic missile, orbital debris 
versus destruction of New York City is an easy 
trade for me to make.  I believe we need to at least 
look at it by looking at the technology, costs, 
benefits, and policy implications to better inform 
future decisions.  
 
 Lastly, I want to touch on an area that is 
important to me—professional development and 
science and math education.  I spoke with Buzz 
Aldrin last year and we had a long conversation on 
this topic.   
 
 I am interested in ideas on how to strengthen 
youth science and math education, and recruit more 
young folks into aerospace careers.  I think 
professional development is equally important and I 
was pleased that my legislation on space cadre 
management was included in the final 2007 defense 
bill. 
 
 It has been an honor to speak here today.  As 
I mentioned earlier, I think space and in particular, 
national security space, is one of the most exciting 
things our nation does.  We have challenging space 
policy and program issues ahead of us and 
collectively, we have an opportunity to tee up these 
issues for the next Administration.  I look forward 
to your thoughts and suggestions and I hope you 
will share these with Congress as well as the next 
Administration.    
 
 We just celebrated the 50th anniversary of 
the first satellite launch.  It took a unique cadre of 
talented and driven individuals to accomplish what 
our nation did in its first 50 years in space.  It will 
take no less talented and driven of a cadre to shape 
the next 50 years.  I am proud to be associated with 
these endeavors and with the people who make 
them happen.   
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As many of you probably know, my Congressional 
district in Southern California is home to the Space 
and Missile Command – the arm of the Air Force 
tasked with developing and procuring the space assets 
that give America its eyes and ears in space. 
 
It’s also the best Congressional district in the country.  
We are the place for sun, surf, and satellites – the only 
place in America where aerospace engineers have 
tans!   
 
Thousands of these engineers are my constituents.  
And over the years, I have gained a deep and abiding 
respect for both the importance and difficulty of what 
they do.   
 
We ask them to construct an amalgam of circuits, 
wiring, sensors, and fragile structures that must 
survive unimaginable rigors of launch and harsh 
conditions of outer space, with scant possibility of 
repair, and perform flawlessly for years.  And we 
place the technical responsibility for carrying out core 
functions of the government – from communications 
to intelligence to operations – in their hands.   
 
There is very little margin for error. 
 
Given those stakes, SMC and the industry it helps 
lead have amassed an impressive record in recent 
years.  We haven’t had a launch failure nearly a 
decade, 56 in a row and counting.  General Mike 
Hamel at SMC deserves a lot of credit for this 
success. 
 
But we shouldn’t spend too much time patting 
ourselves on the back.  We have some big challenges 
ahead of us.   
 
You’ve just heard from my colleague Terry Everett 
about the budget the President released this week.  
Terry and I have worked closely together on the 
Intelligence Committee and the Space Power Caucus.   
 
I want to keep my remarks today focused on the big 
picture.  My thesis is that the Administration and 
Congress have been snoozing.  Seven years after the 
Rumsfeld Commission Report, which highlighted our 
critical dependence on space, and more than one year 
after the Chinese ASAT test, we have no strategy. 
 
Although China knew the orbit of its satellite, the 
ASAT test nonetheless amply demonstrated its 
capability in space. 
 
The ASAT test put the spotlight on our Achilles heel.  
Our space assets, particularly those in low earth orbit 
(or LEO), are vulnerable. 
 
The test also increased the amount of space debris 
orbiting the Earth by about 20 percent, potentially 
threatening satellites in LEO for decades, if not 
longer.  
 
The tacticians will focus on China – spinning out 
scenarios for ASAT attacks during a conflict in the 
Straits of Taiwan.  Those scenarios are certainly 




But this isn’t a China-specific problem.  The media 
has reported that Russia has had ASAT abilities for 
years.  Other nations also have demonstrated the 
ability to disrupt or degrade our use of space assets.  
And it will not be too difficult for these nations to 
develop more effective ASAT capabilities in the 
coming decades. 
 
The problem is not a short-term hiccup in an 
otherwise solid plan.  It is a long-term strategic 
vulnerability that needs to be addressed now.  China’s 
test was a very urgent wake-up call. 
 
But we pushed the snooze button.  In the year-plus 
since the test – and about a year since Sen. Kyl and I 
discussed this topic at CSIS – the United States 
government has done almost nothing in response.   
 
I would have expected an Administration that warned 
of a “space Pearl Harbor” in the 2000 elections to 
have made a greater effort to protect us against the 
threat.   
 
To be fair, none of the major candidates for President 
has addressed such the threat either. 
 
Our space acquisition budget reflects this lack of a 
strategy.  We behave like kids in a candy store.   
 
The Administration pursues “desirements” – 
technologies that would be great to have but are not 
of the utmost importance.  Not coincidentally, some 
of these projects are staggeringly expensive and entail 
enormous risk.   
 
Recent procurement and operational failures should 
come as no surprise.   
 
Our new President – whoever she or he may be – 
should come into office with a strategy in hand.  But 
we need not wait for a new Administration.  The 
sooner we start this process the better. 
 
The Administration’s 2006 policy statement sets 
general goals, not a strategic vision.  It needs fleshing 
out.  And the new President may have a different 
vision. 
 
But we can surely agree that one key policy goal be to 
maintain our leadership in space for decades to come.  
And to do that, we must be able to counter the threat 
posed by ASAT technologies. 
 
As policy makers, we in Congress don’t have the 
luxury of just throwing stones – though we often 
forget this.  We have to offer constructive 
suggestions.  
 
Here are mine.    
 
In my opinion, any comprehensive strategy to 
preserve our leadership position in space must include 
five elements: intelligence, defensive measures, 
redundancy, risk mitigation, and export control 
reform.   
 
First, we need to understand the motivations of 
adversaries.  Why did China conduct the ASAT test?  
Was China attempting to send the United States a 
message?  Is it announcing its intent to become a 
global strategic rival?   Or, as many believe, is its 
focus primarily regional?   
 
The same questions can be asked of Russia and other 
nations.  What are their capabilities and intentions in 
space and how do they impact our interests? 
 
Those answers are relevant to our strategy.  If China 
is primarily interested in intimidating Taiwan, we 
have some time to adjust to their newly unveiled 
capabilities.  If, however, they intend to develop 
space capabilities to rival ours, time may be short. 
 
Intelligence is a priority.  Congress may want to 
consider asking for a National Intelligence Estimate 
on the test and potential threats to our position in 
space. 
 
We should also talk to the Chinese, in much the same 





I was heartened to hear Defense Secretary Gates 
speak about enhancing military-to-military contacts 
with China.  These sorts of exchanges can not only 
help us better understand China’s motivations, they 
can help avoid the misunderstandings that can lead to 
a more confrontational relationship.   
 
Gates’ model is the strategic dialogue between the US 
and the Soviets during the Cold War, which was key 
to preventing miscalculations. 
 
Second, we should employ defensive measures in 
space, and harden our ground assets.   
 
I can’t discuss the specifics, but it is widely known 
that we have the technology to protect key assets 
against certain kinds of non-physical attacks – 
particularly attacks that use electro-magnetic pulses 
(or EMPs).   
 
We need to think “out of the box” to find other means 
to protect our satellites from attacks.    
 
We should incorporate this technology not only into 
all new military and intelligence satellites, but in 
some commercial satellites as well.    
 
But we shouldn’t expect miracles.  These 
technologies can’t harden a satellite against kinetic 
kill vehicles, like the missile China used in its test.  
We also can’t retrofit assets that are already in space. 
 
We sometimes forget that our space assets are only 
part of the equation.  We depend on ground 
infrastructure to make those assets work. 
 
That infrastructure is vulnerable to all kinds of 
physical attacks like car bombs, electro-magnetic 
attacks, or (like much of our government’s 
information technology backbone) cyber attacks. 
 
If the United States is ever in a war with our space 
assets under attack, you can count on attacks on our 
ground-based space infrastructure as well.   
 
Securing those facilities must therefore be a top 
priority. 
 
But we are unlikely to stop every attack or 
sufficiently protect every space asset.  To protect core 
capabilities, we must build redundancy into our 
overhead architecture – my third suggestion.   
 
We should have multiple assets available to do the 
same job.  That is already the case with certain 
programs, like GPS.  We can afford to lose a few GPS 
satellites without losing much capability.   
 
LEO satellites (like China’s weather satellite) are 
particularly vulnerable.    
 
Using higher orbits – particularly geosynchronous (or 
GEO) orbits – for more assets that we currently keep 
in LEO can help protect our capabilities. 
 
Not all of these redundant assets needs to be in space.  
We can keep some of the satellites on the ground if 
we have the capability to get them into space quickly 
and at a reasonable cost.   
 
This, of course, is the idea behind operationally 
responsive space (or, ORS).  We have begun to invest 
serious time and money in ORS, and there are some 
brilliant rocket scientists working in this area.  And 
yes, some of them are constituents! 
 
The potential of ORS is not yet fully realized, as even 
its biggest proponents will admit.  But that potential 
can be reached if we sustain our commitment and our 
funding. 
 
Redundancy will not be enough, however.  There are 
only so many satellites that the US can afford.  We 
must therefore mitigate our risk by enhancing our 
cooperation with civilian imaging and 
communications assets, and those of our allies – the 
fourth element of my strategy. 
 
The capabilities of commercial imaging and 
communications satellites have grown by leaps and 
 
 
bounds in recent years.  They can serve many of our 
military needs. 
 
Of course, we already make extensive use of civilian 
and ally assets.  During the Iraq war, for example, the 
US military used 2.4 gigabits of bandwidth per 
second – and over half of that communications 
capacity came from commercial sources. 
 
But there is room to grow, particularly in the use of 
commercial imaging products.   
 
We should consider relaxing current restrictions on 
resolution.  Many civilian imaging satellites can 
achieve amazing clarity, and with a few changes can 
provide imagery close to what our military planners 
are used to seeing. 
 
Enhanced cooperation would have the added benefit 
of supporting our space industrial base.  The more we 
use these private companies, the more we enable them 
to grow, developing the industrial base and 
developing capabilities that the US government can 
use. 
 
We will also help provide employment for more 
aerospace engineers.  As I have said many times, 
rocket scientists do not grow on trees.   
 
Fifth and finally, we should fundamentally reexamine 
our approach to export controls. 
 
Restrictions on the space technologies companies can 
export have had the perverse effect of encouraging 
other nations – like China and India – to develop their 
own indigenous technologies. 
  
Rather than buying or renting technology built by 
American companies that are subject to American 
law, we have given these countries the incentive to 
figure it out on their own. 
 
These nations have gained their own strategically 
important industries, denying us a lock on cutting-
edge technologies. 
 
A more balanced – and I believe, more targeted – 
export regime is essential. 
 
I’m not ruling out the possibility of some form of 
multilateral or bilateral agreements, perhaps to 
preclude the debris-causing sort of test that China 
conducted last year.   
 
An informal code of conduct that sets norms of 
behavior for space-faring nations could be 
particularly helpful in restraining reckless behavior 
like last year’s test.   
 
History has shown that multilateral diplomatic 
pressure – peer pressure, if you will – can be very 
effective in setting norms for space. 
 
But we should be realistic about what formal 
agreements can achieve. Identifying which programs 
are covered is a challenge, and it could be almost 
impossible to verify compliance.    
 
We should also mind our words.  Using needlessly 
provocative language is foolish.  Our current space 
capabilities are no match for any other nation, even 
given China’s test.   
 
Given that advantage, we would have much to lose in 
a space arms race, in which other nations have the 
excuse to invest in offensive capabilities that go far 




These five suggestions could form the core of a space 
strategy. 
 
It’s time to wake up, get focused, and implement a 
comprehensive strategy to protect our position in 
space.   
 
We snooze at our peril. 
 
 
 
